The Yankees knew that it was time to move A.J. Burnett. 

It was February, and New York had explored a fair number of options with the right-hander. At one point in the offseason, New York had a deal to send Burnett -- three years into his five-year, $82.5 million deal -- to the Angels, but Burnett employed his no-trade protection (which allowed him to veto deals to 14 teams, most to the West of the Mississippi) to nix the swap. Aside from the Angels, interest from the baseball world for most of the offseason had bordered on non-existent. 

But New York felt that Burnett had reached a point of no return. Bringing him back for 2012 wasn’t a viable option. 

Things had gone well in Burnett’s first year in pinstripes, when he went 13-9 with a 4.04 ERA and helped the Yankees to a World Series title. But in 65 starts over the 2010 and 2011 seasons, things had gone off the rails. Burnett went 21-26 with a 5.20 ERA in those two seasons, and virtually every one of his starts labeled him either a failure or a tease whose performance failed to live up to his abilities on a consistent basis. 

And so, as the start of spring training approached, it was time for the Yankees to act. 

“He'd gotten to the point where he was a lightning rod in this town,” New York GM Brian Cashman explained during the season. “He worked his tail off. The performance was inconsistent, but in terms of effort and accountability, that was there. But every time he took the ball, every five days, it was like Game 7 of the World Series. From the fans' perspective and the media's perspective, everyone was waiting for him to fail. That's a tough environment to play in. We knew he'd be in a much better situation somewhere else.”

The Yankees were motivated by more than concern for Burnett’s well-being, of course. The team felt that its payroll entering the season had been maxed out. If Cashman could find a team willing to absorb some of Burnett’s salary, then he could round out his roster to achieve the sort of depth he wanted, and indeed needed, given the increasing age and corresponding health concerns related to the Yankees’ core. 

The Pirates had shown little interest in Burnett earlier in the offseason. But after trying but failing to acquire a number of pitchers during the winter, Pittsburgh was open to a Burnett deal. 

“They were pursuing other guys like Edwin Jackson. They struck out on I don't know how many before they revisited the A.J. thing in the winter,” said Cashman. “They were able to capitalize on it. I thought he had a lot of upside for a team. Pittsburgh obviously benefited from that. They were pursuing other options and didn't pursue A.J. until those other options failed.

“I was just very honest and direct about it. It was what it was. Pittsburgh's benefitting a great deal. I thought he was a great bounceback candidate. It reminded me of when we signed Jimmy Key as a free agent, after seven or eight guys said no to us first.”

Indeed, Burnett had a very strong year in Pittsburgh, going 16-10 with a 3.51 ERA while logging over 200 innings. He was everything for which the Pirates could have hoped, particularly given that the Pirates parted with a pair of non-prospects and absorbed just $13 million in salary over the two remaining years of the deal.  

But Cashman was left with few regrets. After all, he was able to use the money freed up by dealing Burnett to revamp his roster in a fashion that bolstered the Yankees’ depth and, more immediately, resulted in a remarkable come-from-behind win on Wednesday night that took the Yankees from the brink of elimination in their Division Series against the Orioles to the cusp of heading to the ALCS. 

Raul Ibanez stepped to the plate in the bottom of the ninth inning as a pinch-hitter for Alex Rodriguez against Orioles closer Jim Johnson and the Yankees, trailing 2-1, just two outs from a 2-1 deficit in the best-of-five series. He promptly pulverized a two-seamer, slamming it into the right-field seats to tie the game, 2-2. Ibanez then mashed another solo shot, this one into the second deck against left-hander Brian Matusz, to lead off the 12^th inning, giving the Yankees a 3-2 walkoff victory and a 2-1 series lead. 

The Yankees were able to sign Ibanez -- as well as Eric Chavez and Andy Pettitte -- with the money they saved by dumping Burnett. Burnett was traded on Feb. 19; two days later, New York announced the deals with both Ibanez and Chavez, while Pettitte returned in March. 

Ibanez signed for $1.1 million (he went on to earn an additional $2.05 million in bonuses) and hit .240 with a .308 OBP, .453 slugging mark and 19 homers in 130 games. Chavez hit .281/.348/.496 with 16 homers in 113 games while earning a guaranteed $900,000 (as well as an additional $975,000 in incentives). Pettitte, who went 5-4 with a 2.87 ERA during the regular season, signed for $2.5 million during spring training. 

So, the Yankees reallocated their savings from the amount of Burnett’s deal absorbed by the Pirates in order to sign three key members of its playoff roster for a guaranteed $4.5 million.

“Moving A.J. allowed me to do other things on the major league roster that I wouldn't have been able to do if I didn't have that money freed up,” said Cashman. “Even though we're paying the Pirates, it allowed me to diversify in other areas and reinforce.”

The significance of those reinforcements is now obvious for the Yankees, who now stand one game from returning to the ALCS. 

But the relevance isn’t just limited to the Yankees. For the Red Sox, there are two meaningful takeaways.

First, that the Yankees had to absorb roughly $18 million over the final two years of Burnett’s deal underscores the fact that the Sox got a remarkable get-out-of-jail-free card from the Dodgers. The Sox were only left to assume about $12 million total of the approximately $270 million they owed to Adrian Gonzalez, Carl Crawford, Josh Beckett and Nick Punto. 

That said, the Yankees offered a roadmap of how to use reallocated funds in efficient and effective fashion. Cashman wanted to have financial flexibility at the end of the offseason, when the dynamic of the offseason shifts from a sellers’ to a buyers’ market. He grabbed Hiroki Kuroda on a one-year deal at the end of January, then used a trade that shed a player whose tenure with the Yankees had run its course to acquire three players who became valuable assets. 

“There's no guarantee you're going to get anyone at the back end of the market,” said Cashman. “But I do think there are players that become available, if they are still on the board in late-January, February, I think there's a chance for you to take advantage of that, because a lot of teams appear to be past the winter meetings.”

And so, as the Sox enter a period of committing to what GM Ben Cherington has described as a “disciplined” approach to free agency, the team could do worse than to follow the template that proved so effective for the Yankees last winter.