FORT MYERS, Fla. — Ah, the committee.

Really, the whole experiment lasted just three months. And in relative terms, the whole thing was eons ago.

Dustin Pedroia was in college. Daniel Bard was in high school. Terry Francona was not yet the Boston manager at a time when the 2003 Red Sox dabbled in the dark art of a closer-by-committee, an experiment in relief alchemy that is now punishable by stoning.

But its legacy persists. The idea became — and remains — an easy target for ire. The Sox bullpen was a mess operating without a defined ninth-inning pitcher (particularly while governed by then-manager Grady Little, a man whose bullpen touch was … suspect). The idea of mixing and matching for the game’s final outs came to be viewed as an act of profound stupidity.

But that, of course, was not what the idea of the committee was about. The experiment was rooted in the notion that the most important outs of a game do not always take place in the ninth inning. Sometimes, a team is far better served having its most dominant reliever handle key outs in the sixth … or seventh … or eighth innings than the ninth.

“I remember, the year before I got here, they had that closer by committee that didn’t work very well,” Francona told reporters on Tuesday. “The idea is when the game’s on the line in the seventh or eighth and you want somebody in there that can get the job done.”

The baseball world this offseason engaged in an industry-wide embrace of that notion, in a sense. In some respects, the market for closers — the men tethered to the ninth inning — was sluggish. The market for middle relievers, on the other hand, exploded.

There was widespread disgust among talent evaluators about the dramatic rise in salaries for pitchers who would not be asked to record a game’s final three outs. Joaquin Benoit’s deal with the Tigers (three years, $16.5 million) in early November set the market for setup men, and was used as a baseline for several contracts to follow.

Five different middle relievers received three-year deals this winter. Eleven pitchers who were signed with the expectation that they would not close received deals of at least $4 million per year, led by Yankees setup man Rafael Soriano (3 years, $35 million) and Sox setup man Bobby Jenks (2 years, $12 million).

Yes, these are contracts fraught with risk. Long-term, big-money investments in middle relievers have a terrible track record. Nonetheless, that teams were willing to take the plunge on such deals this offseason was a tacit acknowledgement that it is just important for teams to secure safe passage on the march to the ninth inning as it is for them to have a light’s-out closer for the final three outs of the game.

“Sometimes [if] you wait to get to your closer, you’ve already lost,” Francona said. “It’s bases loaded, seventh inning, you’re going to lose right there.”

Yet the psychology of the modern bullpen is such that a team needs a definitive ninth-inning presence.

“I think it helps to designate a closer no matter what, just so you know,” Bard said. “It allows everyone in the bullpen to fall into their given roles.”

“I think a bullpen runs best when everyone’s got their roles,” agreed Jenks. “Sometimes you can win a game in the seventh, but those three outs are still the hardest to get. Bullpen by committee, it’s never a good idea. We’ve seen it in the past. It never works with any team. Having everyone in their roles, as relievers, we need to be creatures of habit. Having our routine. Without that set role, even if you’re a seventh/eighth-inning guy, back and forth, you know what you need to do to get yourself ready that day.”

To the extent that such an outlook is nearly universal among relievers, the Sox were able to construct their bullpen in what could be deemed almost ideal fashion this offseason. They have Jonathan Papelbon as the fixed end-point of the game, responsible for the ninth inning.

Yet thanks to Jenks and Bard, they have the flexibility to use pitchers with closer-caliber stuff in earlier game situations. If a game is on the line in the sixth or seventh or eighth innings, they can turn to an elite pitcher — perhaps even their best reliever, if Bard proves capable of repeating his overpowering 2010 campaign — in the most highly leveraged situation of a game.

“Bard for me is the best weapon you can have. Not having to pigeon hole him is a huge weapon. He can come in in the seventh and get an out. He can pitch the eighth,” Francona said. “He won’t be doing that forever because he’s too good — he’s going to be a closer — but for now he’s a huge weapon for us.

“We kind of did it with Pap that one year. That’s why when we got [Billy Wagner to be a setup man in late 2009], our bullpen got so much better. Because we got a guy with closer’s stuff that we were able to pick a spot in the seventh or eighth to bring him in. It made our bullpen so much better.”

That, in turn, is what the Sox hope to accomplish in 2011. The team has Closer Present in Papelbon, Closer Past in Jenks and Closer Future in Bard. As such, if the three perform in line with their career track records, there should be few nights when Francona is left sleepless by the thought that he went to the wrong pitcher at a decisive moment of the game.

Going with a closer-by-committee did not work for the Sox in 2003. But, the team hopes, having a fleet of pitchers worthy of the title of closer will help the Sox move on from their relief struggles of a year ago.